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PEER GHULAM NABI, JINGZHONG YE

It is sometimes claimed that Operation Sadbhavana, a counter-insurgency programme deployed to win the “hearts and minds” of the alienated masses of Kashmir has been successful. The local populace, however, considers these programmes as a tactic devised by the army to bolster its credibility and reach. The army occupation of large swathes of land in Kashmir has resulted in depeasantisation of rural areas, compounding the alienation of the people. This paper examines the narratives underlying the Sadbhavana programmes, military land grabs, and the counter-insurgency methods adopted in strife-torn Kashmir. It suggests that the army’s belief that it can battle insurgency, which is essentially a political issue, through development projects and “effective governance” is an erroneous perception of reality.

In 1998, the Indian army launched Operation Sadbhavana, a goodwill programme, in Kashmir. Designed as a soft approach to counter-insurgency, the operation aimed to win the “hearts and minds” of people by undertaking “development” programmes and engaging with the youth. It signalled an overall change in attitude of the military towards dealing with the civilian population and represented an adaptation, if not imitation, of the British counter-insurgency model practised in Malaya (1948–60). Over the years, the programme, which started as a pilot project, has spread all over the Valley and is concentrated mainly around the countryside of Kashmir.

From the Indian military’s point of view, militancy has destroyed infrastructure, such as roads and schools, and therefore, it wants to create employment, initiate development and youth empowerment programmes to bring back the “glory of Kashmir.” This has led the military to organise student “exposure” programmes,¹ initiate mini hydroelectricity projects, build schools, felicitate *Hajjies*,² organise sporting events and so on. However, in Kashmir, these development and goodwill activities are seen as tools to increase the military’s legitimacy, which it does not have due to the excessive force it has been using against the very population it is meant to help. At the same time, the occupation of lands and houses (private and state-owned) by the military has further complicated the situation and raised questions on the motives behind such programmes.

Operation Sadbhavana and its development-centred approach to counter-insurgency should be examined in the context of these dynamics and the ongoing debate about the role of the military as a “development” agency (Fitzsimmons 2008; Dixon 2009; Aggarwal and Bhan 2009; Egnell 2010) in the presence of a functional civilian government.

‘Hearts and Minds’ Approach

Soft approaches such as winning “hearts and minds” to tackle insurgency have occupied a significant space in counter-insurgency literature. It is being argued that the main thrust of the hearts and minds approach should be to win people’s trust, which in turn would decrease the popularity of insurgents among people, thereby weakening, if not eliminating, insurgency. These approaches have become a part of the counter-insurgency debate since the British used the approach or the Templer model for the first time in Malaya (1948–60).³ Since then, three major points which are at the core of the hearts and minds approach have been put forward and at the same time have been contested by different scholars.

This research was conducted in Kashmir. Given the situation in Kashmir, it would not have been possible to conduct the research without the support of some fellow scholars, journalists and friends in the region, besides our respondents. We wish to thank all of them. We would also like to thank Jennifer Franco, Tony Fuller, Emilia Szekely, Wajahat Ahmad, Inam ul Haq and an anonymous reviewer for comments on this paper. The study was written up at the China Agricultural University, Beijing, and the Centre for Research and Development Policy, Srinagar, under the supervision of Jingzhong Ye.

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Good Governance as the Solution: Ranging from the British policy in Malaya to that of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Afghanistan to India's policy in Kashmir, existing literature (Anant 2011; Bhonsle 2009; Dixon 2009; Joseph nd) stresses that a policy of good governance can counter insurgency. Under the good governance approach, the military is used as an agency to provide development. The idea is to create success stories out of development and employment programmes, thereby alienating people from the insurgents (Dixon 2009). However, there is a sizeable amount of literature which questions the role of military even in disaster situations. And when it comes to the military carrying out development programmes, serious questions have been raised by many development agencies and scholars (Peer 2014; Levinson 2008; Dixon 2009; Egnell 2010). The closeness of the military to civil affairs is a largely unaddressed issue. Moreover, the question of good governance as a solution to insurgency has not been fruitful either (Fitzsimmons 2008). Nevertheless, counter-insurgency theories that inform governments continue to stress the point of good governance as a remedy for all insurgencies.

Media and Communication Management: The second important element of the hearts and minds approach is to have some form of control over the media so that the masses can be informed about the military's plans. Bhonsle (2009) emphatically argues that India needs to do media management in Kashmir. He recommends the use of the radio and vernacular dailies, the most common modes of media in rural Kashmir, and stresses the importance of bringing the editors on board to let the "good stories" about the military spread. This argument is echoed by Anant (2011) as well. Media manipulation or spreading the message of "hope," "peace," "development" and "employment opportunities" under the military regime, and the destruction of these very elements by the insurgents are to be conveyed to the larger masses through the media.

Use of Minimum Force: The third element of this approach is the use of minimum force against the civilian population. Templer adopted this policy in the later stages of insurgency in Malaya, and likewise, NATO forces applied the same strategy post 2006 in Afghanistan. In Kashmir, the Indian army also adopted a hearts and minds approach in 1998, almost 10 years after the insurgency had begun. A number of scholars have argued that minimum use of force in civilian areas would lead to better results than coercive steps which create fear among the masses (Anant 2011; Dixon 2009; Egnell 2010; Bhonsle 2009).

Keeping the above-mentioned three points in mind, a question comes to the fore in respect of Operation Sadbhavana—why did the rural people actively participate in the 2009 protests which rocked the Valley, and continued to protest against the army, when the programmes implemented under the operation were a "success?" This question was earlier raised by Anant (2011).

We examined this matter during our field study in two northern districts of Kashmir—Kupwara and Bandipora—where scores of Operation Sadbhavana programmes took place. Most

of the rural people joined the mass protests held in the Valley in 2008, 2009 and 2010, and viewed the Operation Sadbhavana programmes with scepticism. This study attempts to understand this scepticism. This leads us to some larger questions—to what extent does the theory of hearts and minds help to bring peace⁴ or to solve the problem of insurgency? Has Operation Sadbhavana brought about development in Kashmir? If yes, whose development, on whose behalf, and for whom? How is the operation perceived by local people in light of the army's occupation of large chunks of land in the region? Is the military capable of undertaking development programmes? And lastly should the army be involved in any development activities at all, when there is an elected government in place?

This paper is a product of three rounds of field research in Kashmir. It uses discourse and narrative analysis to address the questions posed above. It tries to find answers in the light of (a) the history of Kashmir conflict and India's response to this conflict; (b) the emergence of insurgency in Kashmir and the response of the military; (c) the emergence and operationalisation of Operation Sadbhavana and people's response to it; (d) the discussion on the role of the military in the development process, its occupation of lands and human rights violations during the implementation of Operation Sadbhavana programmes.

The field research was conducted by the first author during three phases in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in Kupwara and Bandipora Districts of Jammu and Kashmir. It applied snowballing sampling technique to identify respondents in Drugmulah, Punzgam, Keygam, Zangle villages of District Kupwara, and Asham, Badwen, Hopri, Bunkute, Kralpora villages of District Bandipora.

A total of 94 interviews were conducted (group and individual). Most of the interviews were conducted in the border areas of Kupwara and Bandipora. Scholars, journalists, politicians, government officials, police officers and civil society actors in Srinagar were also interviewed.

An Overview of Operation Sadbhavana

With the relative decline in militancy in the early 2000s, the Indian army began implementing Operation Sadbhavana, a soft method, to counter insurgency. However, this soft approach did not replace the coercive approach used by the military but was employed in parallel. Initially, the Indian military had adopted different conventional methods and tactics to combat insurgency, which included mass arrests, crackdowns to hunt for insurgents, search operations, frisking and identity card checks, detention without trial, etc. According to Anant (2011), the military evolved tactics such as "development of road-opening parties, use of a counterinsurgency grid system, covert apprehension technique, use of ikhwans or captured militants in counterinsurgency and creation of a special counterinsurgency force, *Rashrtiya Rifles*" (cf, Anant 2011: 12) to combat insurgency.

With the use of all possible strategies, the army was able to control militancy in the Valley, but it was not able to counter mass alienation and bring "hostile" people to its side. Thus, Operation Sadbhavana was envisaged to assuage this feeling

of alienation. Bhonsle (2009) identifies three core elements of the Indian military's "Winning the Hearts and Minds" (WHAM) approach—people-friendly military operation; civil action/development work; and public information and perception management operations. He argues that the programme has been successful despite Pakistan's efforts to derail the peace process.

Similar programmes had been adopted to fight insurgency in North-East India. The transfer of some military officers posted in the North East to the Kashmir Valley made the application of this programme possible in the rural areas of Kashmir (Bhonsle 2009; Anant 2011). According to these officers, the battle of counter-insurgency could not be won unless people were on their side. Hence it was important to put Operation Sadbhavana at the centre of the military's counter-insurgency strategy.

Aggarwal and Bhan (2009: 539) argue:

The military's foray into governance was not merely a neutral or altruistic undertaking, but one that aided the military in strengthening its structures of power and pacification.

It is pertinent to note that the application of the Indian Army's strategy of WHAM in Kashmir coincided with the decline of insurgency and was employed simultaneously with repressive tactics to counter militancy. Although the combination of these seemingly conflicting tactics appeared as a contradiction, it was the use of the classic concept of Gramscian hegemony, based on coercion and (manufactured) consent. The WHAM approach has been part of the training imparted to soldiers in the Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare Schools at Khrew (Kashmir), Sarol and Bhaderwah (Jammu) (Anant 2011).

Over the years, the funding for the operation has also increased. For example, in 2008–09, the total budget of the operation was Rs 276 crore. This money was meant to be utilised on quality education, women empowerment, healthcare, community development, and infrastructure development. Nevertheless, the primary focus of the army in the initial years of the operation was to conduct elections, revive the tourism industry and counter propaganda, which would help to bring peace and counter-insurgency (Anant 2011). According to Anant (2011), Operation Sadbhavana also attempted to battle "the negative propaganda" by facilitating youth exchanges between Kashmir and different states of India, which helped to counter Pakistan and separatists' argument for an independent Kashmir. This and other Operation Sadbhavana programmes such as building schools, support to government-run schools, developing mini hydroelectric projects, providing financial and material support to orphanages, building bridges, setting up medical camps, and running vocational and training centres are being put forward as positive stories in defence publications. However, the underlying motives behind these programmes do not appear in the literature (Ganguly 2009; Bhonsle 2009; Anant 2011).

Youth Exchange Programmes: The army's role was important in combating insurgency, which encouraged the mainstream politicians to take part in the 1996 elections, which

were held after seven years of central government rule. However, at the same time, it occupied many agricultural lands, houses, tourist places and were seen as jeopardising peace in the Valley (Saikia J 2006).⁵ The army ran youth exchange programmes and provided opportunities to the lower-middle class rural youth to see the urban cities of India. Nevertheless, these visits did not drive the youth against the basic purpose of the Kashmiri movement and were just seen as interesting excursions. A youth participant from the Lolab Valley, Kupwara District, put it this way:

I had never been outside Kashmir. When I was offered the chance to travel outside free of cost, I just grabbed the opportunity. If anyone would have asked me to travel free to Mumbai or Delhi, I would have done it. Going for a trip with the military does not mean I forget that what they have done with us. They have humiliated us and tortured our brothers.⁶

Goodwill Schools: Though the opening of "Goodwill Schools" by the army have been welcomed by the people living in remote areas, some have questioned the necessity of opening these schools in the first place. A Kashmir university professor stated:

What is the logic of having schools in the villages, where there are already more schools than students? State governments often have to close the state government-run schools because there are not enough students.⁷

There are many school buildings being constructed by the army in rural areas, such as in Gurez, Karnah, Lolab, Handwara and in the Ladakh region. These schools can be easily identified because their foundation stones have been laid by senior army officers, with their names inscribed on these stones. Anant (2011) argues that "Goodwill schools" provide quality education, unlike state government-run schools. However, she cautions that these schools should be named after national leaders rather than military officers. In doing so, it will help the students to remember the national leaders and help them identify with mainstream culture. Furthermore, Anant's argument that there are not enough qualified teachers in government schools does not hold water, as people in Kashmir prefer government jobs, no matter how meagre the salary they get. Government schools in Kashmir have highly qualified teachers, while the private schools attract people who cannot find jobs either in government schools or elsewhere.

Orphanages and Hostels: Together with the schools, the army has been funding orphanages and hostels. As the conflict has claimed thousands of lives, it has turned thousands of children into orphans. Since society in general could not cope with the pressure of taking care of a rising number of orphans, hundreds of orphanages sprung up in the Valley to provide shelter, food, healthcare and education to these orphans. Some estimates suggest, there are more than 1,00,000 orphans in the Valley.⁸ While there are some orphanages that are directly funded by the military, many others get financial and material support from them. Nonetheless, many orphanages have to face the wrath of the separatists for taking support from the military. An orphanage in Kupwara was accused of

taking support from the military. However, the director of the orphanage showed his helplessness in refusing army support. He put it this way:

They came with some rations, and some other things to offer us as a token of support. We never asked for it. Can we say no to their support? If we say so, that means we are with the militants.⁹

Women Empowerment Programmes: Likewise, community development programmes and women empowerment programmes and computer training centres have received a mixed response. Some people see them as an opportunity to gain knowledge. However, women in general are not quite positive about joining these programmes as they are being run by the military. The reasons that make women stay away from the programmes are the experiences and memories of rapes and multiple forms of sexual harassment faced by them at the hands of Indian security forces.¹⁰

Healthcare Services: Under Operation Sadbhavana, the army has been setting up medical camps in remote villages to provide healthcare facilities to the rural people. These medical camps, organised in collaboration with state department of health, provide free medical care, including medicines as a goodwill gesture. Moreover, the army hospitals in remote areas are the only health centres available to the rural masses in cases of emergency. The absence of proper government-run medical facilities in remote areas is seen as a deliberate policy that let people be dependent on the army, so that it can project itself as the sole messiah of the people. This would help the military gain legitimacy and strengthen the dependency of people on it. A university student from Tangdar said:

During the earthquake of 2005, military provided us all the facilities. There was no government, no police, only the army which helped us.¹¹

Infrastructure Development: The military has been contributing to the development of infrastructure in the Valley. It has, over the years, developed micro-hydropower projects to bring electricity to rural villages. Nonetheless, there are many projects which have become defunct and are non-functional due to technical failures and poor coordination between the state government and the army.

Whatever the case, the army is engaged in some development work in the region. However, its efforts still have not borne fruit. The next few sections would delve into the reasons why the army has been so far unsuccessful in generating goodwill among people.

Military and Development

The word Sadbhavana literally means “goodwill.” However, when the word operation is prefixed to Sadbhavana it simply means interventionist “goodwill.” Therefore the first inherent problem in Operation Sadbhavana-led development programmes is that they are externally-driven interventionist programmes run by a non-development agency. It is difficult to understand why the army has to undertake development

programmes when the elected state government is legitimately commissioned to do this job.

Interventionist development programmes have been contested and debated by many scholars (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995; Long 2004; Koponen 2004) and have been found to undermine local people’s will and do not often yield positive results. Whether it is taking youth from the rural areas for a tour of India, inviting *Hajjies* for dinner or lunch parties, helping orphanages, or for that matter renovating shrines, all these measures, in many places, are seen as unsolicited development interventions (Jaleel 2007).¹² In a similar vein, “exposure programmes” and coaching and training programmes for the youth are seen as a way to attract Kashmiri students to India and make them forget the harsh realities back home. Nevertheless, the adoption of a Western counter-insurgency strategy by the Indian Army, which advocates resolving of political issues of identity through improvement in governance and promotion of development, may not be the answer in Kashmir. Michael Fitzsimmons (2008: 338) puts it very eloquently:

The premise of most Western thinking on counter-insurgency is that success depends on establishing a perception of legitimacy for the ruling regime among some critical portion of the local population. Among the mechanisms available to counter-insurgents for establishing that legitimacy, one of the most prominent in both practice and doctrine has been the improvement of governance in the form of effective and efficient administration of government and public services. Good governance, by this logic, is the key to ‘winning hearts and minds.’

Governance, development or humanitarian issues are without any doubt important, especially in the rural areas of Kashmir, but they are not the main concern of Operation Sadbhavana. The main focus appears to be tackling insurgency and creating legitimacy for the army for which development is used as a tool. However, as Fitzsimmons argues, many times people would accept bad governance of their own rather than the good governance of outsiders. So no matter how effective these development programmes might seem, they are seen as being run by the military, which is conceived as an external force controlling Kashmiri land. As Egnell (2010: 294) argues, “every change in the direction of our perception of a legitimate system may in fact be the opposite in the eyes of the local population, or at least in the eyes of the local leaders with stakes to lose.”

The second point is that the military lacks the expertise and skills to administer development and humanitarian programmes. There is an ongoing debate that involvement of military in development and humanitarian programmes is problematic, as it is authoritative and, at the same time, it undermines the sustainability of these projects (Peer 2014; Levinson 2008; Egnell 2010). For example, 300 micro-hydropower projects built by the army in Kupwara are defunct; similar is the case with many schools, health units and vocational training centres. This indicates that either the military is not as competent as the civilian authorities to run development and humanitarian programmes or in many cases there is a conflict between the two.

The third point is that the military-led development programmes are not need-based. Moreover, the military involvement in humanitarian and development programmes blurs the line between the military and civilian actors, and the military’s

involvement in civilian affairs can undermine civilian actors, including the elected government. For example, while the 2010 Kashmir Premier League (KPL) cricket tournament which was organised by the army was officially and publicly supported by the civil administration, in private, these officials spoke against the army entering into the domain of civilian affairs.¹³ While the military in Kashmir tries to engage with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and orphanages to offer their support, the orphanages are reluctant to be a part of the military-supported programmes. Nonetheless, they have to sometimes accept the material support to avoid being seen as anti-military.

The fourth inherent problem with military-led development programmes is that it puts pressure on the military forces to do extra work. There is no specific unit to run Sadbhavana programmes; existing officers have to perform additional tasks to execute these programmes (Anant 2011). It has also been observed that while administering these programmes, corruption has crept in.¹⁴ But this corruption is not just limited to army-run projects in Kashmir; lately, confessions of many Indian army generals regarding the corruption in arms deals are a reflection that the military is no longer a sacred cow, rather an agency that can accumulate more wealth by dispossession (Pande 2013; Harvey 2003).

Military involvement in doling out “secret funds” to politicians and facilitating the victory of one politician over another in the state assembly elections in Kashmir is to keep their “favoured political leaders” in power, who would, in return, justify the military presence in the Valley (Noorani 2013). These secret funds, doled out without accountability, are not only given to politicians and NGOs (Noorani 2013) but to the media as well. This puts Kashmir in the category of what Paglen (2009) calls the “secret state.” Thus the development work carried under Operation Sadbhavana here is not for inculcating “goodwill,” but to gain legitimacy and control, accumulate more wealth, and on top of that to reinforce the power asymmetry (Ferguson 1994).

Military and Land Grabs

When the insurgency began in 1988, the minority Pandit population, due to fear of the militants and with support and encouragement from the government,¹⁵ left the Valley, leaving their homes unattended. This provided an opportunity for the military to venture into residential areas and occupy the left-behind houses and non-residential buildings, such as schools, government offices, cinemas, hotels and so on. In the meantime, large tracts of private, state, customary forest and agricultural land were brought under the control of the military.

From 1947 onwards, according to government records, the Indian military, under the guise of “national security,” has grabbed 10,54,721 kanals (or 53,353 hectares) of land in Kashmir (Haroon 2009). However, by local accounts,¹⁶ the official government tally is just the tip of the iceberg, and the actual land under the military control is much more than that. The People's Democratic Party (PDP), the ruling party in Kashmir,

and the separatist party, the Hurriyat Conference (G), have stated that 28,00,000 kanals of land were subject to military control.¹⁷ Interestingly, the data from the department of forestry, which claims that around 49,000 hectares¹⁸ of forest area is under military control, contradicts the government's claim that there are only 53,353 hectares of land under the military.

The occupation of agricultural land, forest land, state land and private buildings have led to dispossession, de-peasantisation, loss of livelihoods and forced commoditisation, severely affecting the food sovereignty of the peasantry in rural Kashmir. Moreover, the army control of forests has on the one hand made these forests inaccessible to the local people and on the other it has provided an opportunity for the army to smuggle timber.¹⁹ A case in point—on 11 June 2013, an army truck carrying timber was seized by the Kupwara District police (Fayaz 2013). This was not the first instance when the army had been caught cutting down and smuggling trees. This has been happening since the military landed in Kashmir. However nobody dares to question it. A former state home minister of Kashmir put it this way:

The timber smuggling by the military has been happening since they started controlling our forests. It is not new. The bigger question is who will question them. Nobody wants to get killed.²⁰

While the poor people have to buy firewood and timber from the market, the army enjoys control of the forests; and even a government forest officer has to seek permission from the military to enter the forest area. The occupation of these lands and the illegal activities of the army have led the dispossessed people to believe that there is no justice in the state. A peasant from Hugnallah says:

They say it is democracy here. But this is not a democracy, this is terrorism. They forcibly took our lands. They beat our youth and elders, men and women. I told the army officer that they are forcing us to pick up the gun. The military officer replied that you are free to do that. We know how to deal with militancy...but do not expect us to leave this land.²¹

There are thousands of others like him who have similar or more painful stories to tell, and who—because of land grabs—have lost their land, livelihoods, cultural and traditional affiliations that go with them, and on top of all that the loss of the “right to continue being an agriculturalist” (Edelman 2005: 332). In some cases, the military pays the rent while in others it does not. However, even in cases where it pays, the rent, it is just a meagre amount and does not suffice to cover some of their basic needs like spices for a month. A former minister was quoted in the local daily newspaper *Greater Kashmir*:

It is unfortunate and a grave injustice to the poor farmers that the military has occupied farmland or orchards in five to six villages in Kupwara, and they do not pay anything to the owners. I fail to understand how this will help in restoring peace.²²

Besides agriculture, forest, and customary lands—which have direct bearing on the livelihoods of the common people—the army has occupied many tourist places such as Toasmaidan, parts of Gulmarg, Pahalgam, the Bangus Valley and so on. This move is in contradiction with one of the initial

objectives of Operation Sadbhavana—revival of the tourism industry. The occupation of these tourist places has resulted in an “opportunity lost” for the state economy. Infuriated by the military land grabs in Gulmarg, the former Chief Minister Omar Abdullah criticised the military openly. He said, “The way it (Army) is spreading boundaries of the school...the day is not far when it would have to be either the army or the state government in—Gulmarg” (Pandit 2012).

Military and Human Rights Violations

The minimum use of force as a stated goal of Operation Sadbhavana has to be taken into consideration vis-à-vis the army’s actions on the ground. While this goal might exist on paper, the approach of the military in dealing with the common Kashmiri is that of an outside force dealing with the locals in a heavy-handed manner. According to Dixon (2009), this is akin to the British Policy in Malaya which was not really based on the “hearts and minds” approach, as the British forcibly resettled 5,00,000 people that led to mass arrests, detention without trial for up to two years, movement restrictions, curfews, massacres, treating prisoners as criminals and so on.

Similarly, the Indian army policy of counter-insurgency does not reflect the hearts and minds or the true Sadbhavana approach either. The army has been involved in killing civilians, torture, imposing curfews, frisking, requiring identity cards, mass and individual rapes, not allowing vehicles to pass the army convoy, abducting the civilians and passing them off as militants (CCJ 2012; Burke 2012; Jaleel 2013; Staniland 2013). For example in 2010, some youth were abducted from Rafiabad and killed in a fake encounter by the army in Machil and passed off as militants. These killings later became the reason for protests, which rocked the Valley for three months in 2010 and caused the death of more than 100 youth.

It is important to mention here that many Sadbhavana projects became the target of these protestors, as these were seen as symbols of the Indian military occupation. Hoardings which carried the message “*Jawan and awam Aman hay Mukam*” (soldiers and people, together can bring peace) were the first targets and were destroyed by protestors in the rural areas. What is reflected in the reaction of people to these

development programmes is that these cannot replace people’s liberty, rights and political will.

Concluding Remarks

The answer (to the uprising) lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.

— General Sir Gerald Templer, ‘Tiger of Malaya,’ 1952

Even by Templer’s admission, the concentration and expansion of troop bases does not solve the problem of insurgency or conflict. The problem is solved by winning the hearts and minds of the people. Templer’s hearts and minds approach did have an impact on future counter-insurgency policies such as the one adopted in Northern Ireland; but it did not yield fruitful results, when applied in Afghanistan or in Iraq. Discussions have been going on whether the hearts and minds approach or other conventional methods are better to address the issue of insurgency. However, the answer does not lie in looking for the solutions through these two paradigms. Implementing the hearts and minds approach requires the understanding of the historical, political, and socio-economic nature of the insurgency and address it through a political process.

Military-led development programmes have been inherently interventionist, entering into a domain where they have no expertise. Subsequently, these programmes have proven to be ineffective. Such kind of programmes are not seen as just development programmes or a part of the army “goodwill,” they are designed and implemented to gain legitimacy and to maintain territorial control in a region. Moreover, these have largely failed to get the results for which they were designed.

Moreover, these programmes have bred corruption in the military itself and have corrupted the politicians, NGOs, and the media through disbursement of “secret funds” or “source funds” as well. What is being argued here is that if the purpose of the programme is to win the “hearts and minds” of people, then this would require basic withdrawal of forces from tourist places, agricultural lands, forests areas, and of course from private buildings, stop human rights violations in the region, and ultimately, find a solution to the political problem through a political process rather than seeing it as a governance issue. It cannot be tackled through incremental development programmes led by the military.

NOTES

- 1 Under this programme students are taken for “exposure tours” to different cities of India, the purpose of which is to make them aware of the “richness” of the Indian economy, culture, educational institutions and so on.
- 2 Organised dinner or lunch parties for *Hajjies* (those who perform annual pilgrimage to Mecca). Hajj is the fifth pillar of Islam. This information was gathered during interactions with the peasants from Hunzgam, Hugnallah and Hedwen, villages in North Kashmir, in June and July 2013.
- 3 “Hearts and minds” approach is also known as the Templer model. Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, who used the “hearts and minds” approach in Malaya propagated that the insurgency can be curbed by “winning the hearts and minds” of the people by applying less coercive tactics to control counter-insurgency.


- 4 One also needs to note that the discourse on “peace and normalcy” promoted by state actors like the Indian military or paramilitary forces in Kashmir conflates peace with pacification. This understanding of peace is projected by both the civilian and military state actors in Kashmir. It views a radical decline or end to insurgency or pro-Independence protests in Kashmir as benchmarks of peace and normalcy and deliberately overlooks the violence unleashed by the repressive state apparatuses to suppress any kind of anti-state protest in the region.
- 5 Saikia argues that the intelligence organisations, the Indian Army, and the bureaucracy on the Indian side and the Pakistan Army, intelligence agencies and jihadis on the Pakistani side are all “spoilers.”
- 6 Interview with Majid Khan, a college student in Kupwara in June 2012.

- 7 Interview with Hilal Ahmad, a professor of education in Kashmir University in July 2012.
- 8 Source: <http://www.chinar.org/qprograms.htm>. Last viewed on 21 April 2011.
- 9 Interview with the director of an orphanage in Kupwara District on 12 June 2013.
- 10 Interviews with women from the villages of Hugnallah, Heygam, Hunzgam and Hurez in May 2013.
- 11 Interview with a Kashmiri university student Imran Ahmad in Srinagar in June 2013.
- 12 Interviews with a political scientist in the University of Kashmir in May 2012; interview with a human rights activist in Srinagar in April 2012; and interviews with two separatist leaders, Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Mohammad Yaseen Malik, in June 2012.
- 13 Interview with a district development commissioner of a district in North Kashmir in July

2013. The district commissioner blamed the army for providing free alcohol to the youth and running development projects which are not need-based.
- 14 Interviews with military contractors in Srinagar, Kupwara and Bandipora in June, July and August 2012. The contractors claimed that they had to pay a bribe to get the contracts from the military.
 - 15 In the programme "Big Fight" on NDTV, on 23 January 2010, Manish Tiwari, spokesperson of the Congress Party, which was heading the Indian government at that time, stated that Kashmiri Pandit's forced migration from Kashmir was actively facilitated by the then Governor of Kashmir, Jagmohan. Likewise, the legislator and the former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Omar Abdullah, while addressing his party workers in Srinagar on 26 March 2003, had said that "People are well aware of how the then Governor, Jagmohan, under an organised conspiracy, facilitated their (Pandit) migration."
 - 16 Interviews with people from the villages of Heygam, Hugnallah, Hurez and Hunzgam in June 2013.
 - 17 Interview with the separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani on 25 June 2012.
 - 18 Data accessed from forest department of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2013.
 - 19 Interview with people from the villages of Henzgam, Hugnallah, Hurez, Hedwen in Kupwara and Bandipora Districts of Kashmir in June, July and August 2012.
 - 20 Interview with the former home minister of the Kashmir government in Srinagar, June 2013.
 - 21 Interview with a peasant Sonaullah Dar from Hugnallah in June 2012.
 - 22 See Hilal Ahmad (2007), "Mala Begum, A Dispossessed Widow," <http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/gk-magazine/mala-begum-a-dispossessed-widow/26631.html>.
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